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I. INTRODUCTION
Americans look toward 1992, the proposed deadline for final entry
into force of the Single European Act,' with a combination of enthusiasm
and trepidation. The Single European Act signals a return to the origi-
nal, ambitious goal of the Treaty of Rome more than three decades ear-
lier-the formation of a single and fully integrated European market-a
Europe without frontiers. The signing of the Act in February 1986 and
the European Community's (EC) systematic execution of the compre-
hensive agenda towards economic integration represents the unfolding of
historic events in modern world politics that few could have envisaged.
* Mr. Mastromarco is Assistant Chief Counsel for Tax Policy, U.S. Small Business Ad-
ministration, Office of Advocacy. The views expressed herein are his own and do not necessar-
ily reflect those of the agency.
1. Opened for signature Feb. 17, 1986, 30 O.1. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) 1 (1987).
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If implemented in a market-oriented way, the Act will greatly advance
international economic cooperation as part of the global movement to-
ward freer competitive markets, and will enhance both European and
world economic prospects.
The apprehension of United States businesses about this event partly
stems from a perceived lack of preparedness in the United States for stif-
fer competition. The expected increase in European market power, effi-
ciency, and political leverage resulting from European integration has
been the subject of some justifiable concern. More important, however,
is the perception that the unified European market will be less accessible
to American business because of the implementation of inequitable trade
policies designed to give unfair advantage to European competitors.2
For this reason, European Community Directives and Decisions have
been followed closely by the United States academic community, by Con-
gress, and by trade and professional associations, including those which
represent the legal profession.
For the growing portion of the American Bar who practice interna-
tional trade law,3 this fear has been substantiated by two European Court
of Justice4 (Court of Justice) decisions, AM&S Europe Limited v. Com-
2. This perception is exemplified by statements made by U.S. Senator Max Baucus,
Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Trade, Senate Finance Committee when he
proposed talks with Pacific Rim nations as a "counterthreat" to a protectionist European
Community. See Bilateral Trade Agreements: Hearing on S. 137 Before the Subcomm. on In-
ternational Trade of the Finance Comm. of the US. Senate, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (Mar. 13,
1989); see Baucus Proposes "Fortress Pacific" to Balance Europe, [1 No. 4 EUROPE-1992, THE
REPORT ON THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET 73 (Mar. 15, 1989).
3. As one indication, the American Bar Association reports a marked increase in the
number of attorneys who belong to the International Section. Established in 1937 with only a
few hundred lawyers, the section now numbers 11,804 lawyers as of January 1, 1990. Member-
ship Records, A.B.A., 750 N. Lake Shore Dr., Chicago, IL 60611.
4. The EEC Treaty, signed by the six original Member States, entrusted the authority of
the EC to four main institutions: the Assembly, the Council, the Commission, and the Court
of Justice. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 4,
1988 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 47 (Cmd. 455) 82, 83 [hereinafter EEC Treaty] (original version at 298
U.N.T.S. 11). The Commission, consisting of 17 individuals appointed by Member States, id.
arts. 157, 158, at 132, to 4 year terms, id. art. 158, is in effect the executive or administrative
branch of the EC. The Commission's mandate is the implementation and guardianship of the
Treaty. Id. art. 155, at 131. It must act in the interest of the community as a whole, independ-
ent of individual member countries' interests, political parties or the Council. Id. art. 157, at
132. The Commission not only has the right to place the proposals before the Council for
action, but also executes the Council's decisions and can take the other institutions or other
individual countries before the Court of Justice if they are in breach of their responsibilities. Id.
art. 155, at 131.
The European Court of Justice, composed of 13 judges and 6 advocates-general, id. arts.
165, 166, at 134, appointed for 6 year terms, id. art. 167, is responsible for adjudication of
disputes arising out of the Treaties. Id. art. 164. Its findings are enforceable in all the member
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mission of the European Communities ' and John Deere v. Commission of
the European Communities.6
The AM&S and Deere decisions have had the effect of drawing an
important distinction between the ability of counsel within and without
the European Community to secure the privacy interests of their clients.
Under the AM&S decision, the Commission's sweeping powers to investi-
gate are unencumbered by the almost universally recognized right of at-
torney-client privilege in cases in which independent counsel of a
nonmember country is involved. The attorney-client privilege pertains in
the representation of clients on EC matters only if the attorney represent-
ing the client happens to be an independent counsel within the Eu ropean
Community.7
This gross disparity in the application of a legal principle gives EC
lawyers an important advantage over United States and other non-Mem-
ber State lawyers. The decision negatively affects the American legal ser-
vice industry by hindering the ability of United States lawyers to advise
clients on EC matters. It also indirectly affects virtually all American
companies, large and small, by placing them at an unfair disadvantage
with their European competitors who are more apt to rely on outside EC
counsel. Moreover, the incongruity manifested in AM&S I is in conflict
with the laws of the Member States.9 It may also violate existing treaties
between the United States and the individual Member States by which
the European Community is obligated to abide.
The purpose of this Article is to describe briefly the origin of the
Community confidentiality standard, emphasizing the disparate treat-
ment accorded EC and non-EC attorneys; to discuss the nature of the
American attorney-client privilege and the rationale for that privilege;
and to explore the inherent problems presented in the EC position. The
countries. See id. art. 189, at 138. The task of the Court is to ensure the observance of the law
in the interpretation and application of the Treaties setting up the Community, and to imple-
ment regulations issued by the Council or the Commission. Id. art. 177, at 137.
5. 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1575, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8757, at 9037.
6. 28 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 35) 58 (1985).
7. COM(84) 548 final (Oct. 9, 1984) was a recommendation for a council decision au-
thorizing the Commission to open negotiations with a view to the conclusion of agrements
between the EEC and certain third countries concerning the protection of legal papers. How-
ever, no action has been taken on that recommendation.
8. AM&S, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1575, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common
Mkt. Rep. at 9037.
9. Crinion, AM&S Europe Limited v. Commission of the European Communities: Confi-
dentiality of Lawyer-Client Communications in Commission Competition Investigations, 1984
WIS. INT'L L. Rv. 131.
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paper concludes by criticizing the decisions in AM&S and Deere for go-
ing against the underlying spirit of the EC through the disparate applica-
tion of legal principles.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EC ATTORNEY-
CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY STANDARD
A. The AM&S Case
The rule excluding non-EC member attorneys from using the attor-
ney-client privilege finds its genesis in the AM&S decision, which is the
foundation of the Community standard for attorney-client confidential-
ity.1° The AM&S case concerned an investigation ordered pursuant to
Council regulation 17, article 14(1) into suspected price fixing between
several firms in the European zinc industry, including Australian Mining
and Smelting Europe Limited (AM&S)." In conducting the investiga-
tion, the Commission utilized the broad authority delegated to it under
regulation 17, article 14(1). According to that article, "[i]n... carrying
out the duties assigned to it by article 89 and by provisions adopted by
article 87 of the Treaty, the Commission may undertake all necessary
investigation[s]."' 2
In the course of the investigation conducted at the Bristol, England
offices of AM&S, investigators sought certain records which AM&S
claimed were protected under the attorney-client privilege." Deter-
mined to inspect the documents, the Commission issued a Commission
Decision, 4 as authorized under article 14(3) of regulation 17, which re-
quired AM&S to produce all requested documents, including those "for
which legal privilege is claimed."' 5 AM&S refused to submit the docu-
10. AM&S, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1610-13, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common
Mkt. Rep. at 9059-60.
11. Article 87 of the EEC Treaty requires the Council to adopt regulations enforcing the
principles of articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, which specifically prohibit price-fixing agree-
ments between companies within the Community. EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 87, at 108.
The Council of Ministers, composed of the Heads of State from the twelve Member States, is
the centralized legislative body of the EEC. Id. art. 146, at 129. The Council's task is to
establish the law of the Community by making regulations, guidelines and decisions within the
limits fixed by the Treaty, while ensuring the economic cooperation of the Member States. Id.
arts. 145, 189, at 129, 138.
12. [1959-1962] O.J. EUR. COMM. 87, 91 (1962).
13. AM&S Europe v. EEC Commission, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1575, 1579, [1979-
1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8757, at 9037, 9039.
14. Commission Decision No. 79/670/EEC, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 199) 31 (1979).
15. Id. at 33.
A. The Decision
According to the Decision:
[Vol. 13
Attorney-Client-Privilege Without Frontiers
ments for which it claimed privilege, but offered to allow the Commis-
sion to preliminarily inspect a portion of the documents in order to
determine if the privilege applied.16 The Commission rejected AM&S's
offer, maintaining that it was permitted to inspect all documents first to
determine if the privilege applied. 7 When the Commission reasserted its
demand, AM&S brought an action for review in the Court of Justice
under article 173 of the EC Treaty,"8 which permits the Court of Justice
to review the legality of both Commission and Council actions.' 9
AM&S Europe Ltd is hereby required to submit to an investigation... to allow
the Commission officials responsible for the investigation to enter its premises during
normal office hours and to produce for examination...; (a) all fies, correspondence,
telexes, internal memos and any other business records from 1971 to date... ; (b) all
documents for which legal privilege is claimed, as listed in the appendix to AM&S
Europe Ltd's letter of 26 March 1979 to the Commission ....
Id. at 32-33.
In reaching this Decision, the Commission did recognize an earlier position advanced in
reply to Written Question No. 63/78 in the European Parliament, asked by Mr. Couste:
"[T]he Commission 'follows the rules in the competition rules of certain Member States and is
willing not to use as evidence of infringements of Community competition rules any strictly
legal papers written with a view to seeking or giving opinions on points of law .....' "Id. at 32
(quoting 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 188) 31 (1978)). Nonetheless, the Commission dis-
missed AM&S's claim that they may withhold documents on the basis of irrelevancy or confi-
dentiality stating that: "[N]either the undertaking concerned nor its legal advisors can be the
ultimate or only arbiter either as to questions of fact or of law, as to whether any given docu-
ment ... was written in circumstances which would justify its not being used." Id. at 32
(1979).
B. Article 14(2) of Regulation 17 of February 6, 1962, in its original French text
provides:
Les agents mandates par la Commission pour ces v6rifications, exercent leurs
pouvoirs sur production d'un mandat 6erit qui indique l'objet et le but de la v6rifica-
tion, ainsi que la sanction pr6vue a 'article 15, paragraphe 1, alin6a c), du present
r6glement au cas oi les livres ou autres documents professionels requis seraient
pr~sent~s de fagon incompl&e. La Commission avise, en temps utile avant la v6rifica-
tion, l'autorit6 competente de 'Etat membre sur le territoire duquel ]a v6rification
doit &re effectu6e de ]a mission de verification de l'identit6 des agents mandat6s.
5 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 13) 209 (1962).
16. AM&S, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1575, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common
Mkt. Rep. at 9037.
17. Id. at 1580, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. at 9040.
18. Id. at 1578, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. at 9039.
19. EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 173, at 136. The Treaty provides:
The Court of Justice shall review the legality of acts of the Council and the
Commission other than recommendations or opinions. It shall for this purpose have
jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member State, the Council or the Commission on
grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement,
infringement of this Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse
of power.
Any natural or legal person may, under the same conditions, institute proceed-
ings against a decision addressed to that person or against a decision which, although
1990]
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In reaching its decision, the Court considered the laws of the indi-
vidual Member States, recognizing that Community law is derived from
an "approximation" of their collective legal principles.20 The Court
found that all nine Member States recognized the attorney-client privi-
lege to some degree, but that the scope of the privilege and the mecha-
nisms used to enforce it differed widely.2" The Court concluded,
nonetheless, that sufficient similarity existed within the laws of the Mem-
ber States to find a commonly recognized confidentiality principle. Fur-
thermore, the Court held that application of the privilege to certain
attorney-client communications was not precluded by regulation 17,
which empowered the Commission to investigate AM&S.22
In its decision, the Court limited the confidentiality standard to
communications which essentially satisfy three requirements: (1) that
the communication be embodied in a written document between lawyer
and client; (2) that the written document be in the interests of the client's
right of defense; and (3) that the document originate with an independent
lawyer entitled to practice his profession in one of the Member States.2"
in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and
individual concern to him.
Id.
20. Article 3 of the EEC Treaty provides that "the activities of the Community shall
include.., the approximation of the laws of the Member States." Id. art. 3(h), at 83.
21. For a brief outline of relevant elements of Member States' laws, see Advocate-General
Slynn's opinion to the court in AM&S. AM&S Europe v. EEC Commission, 1982 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 1575, 1610-11, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8757, at
9037, 9059; see also D.A.O. EDWARD, THE PROFESSIONAL SECRET: CONFIDENTIALITY AND
LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE IN THE NINE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITY (Commission Consultative Des Barreaux De La Communaut6 Europ6nne publ.).
22. AM&S, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1611-12, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common
Mkt. Rep. at 9059-60.
23. Id. at 1611-12, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. at 9059-60. Specifi-
cally, the Court held as follows:
Community law, which derives from not only the economic but also the legal
interpenetration of the Member States, must take into account the principles and
concepts common to the laws of those States concerning the observance of confiden-
tiality, in particular, as regards certain communications between lawyer and cli-
ent ....
... [T]here are to be found in the national laws of the Member States common
criteria inasmuch as those laws protect, in similar circumstances, the confidentiality
of written communication between lawyer and client provided that, on the one hand,
they emanate from independent lawyers, that is to say, lawyers that are not bound to
the client by a relationship of employment.
As far as the first of those two conditions is concerned.., such protection must,
if it is to be effective, be recognized as covering all written communications ex-
changed [upon] the initiation of the administration procedure under Regulation No.
[Vol. 13
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Applying these conditions to the documents in dispute, the Court held
that the Commission was not empowered by regulation 17 to examine
documents which met all of the three criteria, and reversed the decision
insofar as it sought documents that satisfied these three criteria. The
Commission was permitted to review documents which did not satisfy
these criteria.24
B. The John Deere Case
The Commission wasted little time in capitalizing on the decision
reached in AM&S. Less then three months later, the United Kingdom's
National Farmers Union complained to the Commission that an in-
dependent dealer for John Deere, Inc., located in Belgium, was operating
under restrictive market orders from the parent company.25 The ensuing
investigation of Deere's European offices in Mannheim, Federal Republic
of Germany, encompassed approximately 150 documents, many of which
contained in-house legal documents.26 Barely one year after filing the
original complaint, the Commission completed its review of the docu-
ments and filed a Statement of Objection.27 Both Deere and their dealers
submitted written responses to the Statement of Objection, but were un-
successful in their effort to defeat the Objections or the Quotation of the
Documents, which was later made available.2"
On December 14, 1984, the Commission adopted a decision holding
Deere in violation of article 85(1) and fining Deere two million European
17 which may lead to a decision on the application of Articles 85 and 86... or to a
decision imposing a pecuniary sanction on the undertaking. It may also be possible
to extend it to earlier written communications ....
As regards the second condition .... the requirement as to the position and
status as an independent lawyer ... is based on... the lawyer's role as collaborating
in the administration of justice by the courts and as being required to provide, in full
independence, and in the overriding interests of that cause, such legal assistance as
the client needs....
... [T]he protection thus afforded by community law ... to written communica-
tions between lawyer and client must apply without distinction to any lawyer entitled
to practice his profession in one of the Member States, regardless of the Member
State in which the client lives.
Such protection may not be extended beyond those limits.., based.., on the
mutual recognition by all the Member States of the national legal concepts of each of
them on this subject.
Id. at 1610-12, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. at 9059-60.
24. Id. at 1612, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. at 9060.
25. John Deere v. EEC Commisssion, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 35) 58, 59 (1985).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 60.
28. Id.
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Currency Units (ECUs).29 From their decision it is evident the Court
relied in part upon the content of legal opinions from in-house counsel to
corporation management in order to support its finding that article 85(1)
was intentionally violated. 31 In those opinions, in-house counsel was ad-
vising management of the potential problems surrounding the use of a
contractual clause that might be construed as a contractual export prohi-
bition.31 Although the opinions were issued by counsel in an effort to
effect compliance with EC law, Deere's knowledge of the potential in-
fraction, provided through the in-house counsel's advice, was used
against Deere.32
The Deere opinion has generated much consternation from the
United States legal community and from EC countries which grant full
professional status to in-house lawyers.3 3 This displeasure was expressed
in a 1983 resolution of the American Bar Association's Section of Inter-
national Law and Practice (ABA).34 The ABA's resolution requested
that the Commission extend the confidentiality privilege to all in-house
lawyers, regardless of whether they are nationals of the United States or
of EC Member States. Additionally, the resolution requested that a re-
view of the decision to discriminate against non-EC independent counsel
be undertaken.
There is little doubt that the actions taken against Deere would also
have been taken with the same speed and forcefulness if the company had
used independent American lawyers. The AM&S decision just as clearly
excluded non-Member lawyers from the protections of the privilege as in-
house counsel. Thus, for the present, businesses with EC operations, in-
cluding businesses which normally use in-house counsel, will be forced to
utilize the services of independent EC lawyers or assume the risk that
their internal documents and other communications may be disclosed.
III. THE UNITED STATES LAW OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE
A. Scope of the Privilege
As in the Member States of the EC, all of the states within the
29. Id. at 64.
30. Id. at 61.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Burkard, Attorney-Client Privilege in the EEC: The Perspective of Multinational Corpo-
rate Counsel, 20 INT'L LAW. 677-79 (1986).
34. A.B.A., SECTION OF INT'L LAW & PRACTICE, REPORT No. 301, REPORT TO THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES 8 (Jan. 18, 1983).
[Vol. 13
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United States recognize, to varying degrees, the confidentiality of certain
communications between client and lawyer." The rule is of ancient ori-
gin, predating the American colonial period36 and going as far back as
Roman law.3 7
Much has been written about the scope of the attorney-client privi-
lege in the United States. As in Europe, legal nuances of the privilege
have developed differently in the different states, and there are many fac-
ets to its application. In general terms, however, the privilege is perhaps
best formulated as follows:
Where legal advice of any kind is sought from a professional legal advi-
sor in his capacity as such, the communications relating to that pur-
pose, made in confidence by the client, are at this instance permanently
protected from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, except
when the protection is waived.38
The privileged communications need not relate to litigation, either ex-
isting or contemplated. Instead, it is sufficient for application of the priv-
ilege that the statements are made in the course of legitimate professional
transactions between attorney and client, and that they relate to matters
in which the client has sought the attorney's advice. Indeed, the privi-
lege has been found to extend to cases in which the attorney did not even
recognize the relationship of attorney-client, provided the circumstances
show that the client thought the relationship actually existed.3 9
B. Rationale for the Privilege
The attorney-client privilege in the United States is based not upon
any inclination to accord attorneys special privileges, but upon a desire to
further the interests of justice and its administration and to protect the
lawful rights and interests of clients. The theory underlying the privilege
35. Alexander v. United States, 138 U.S. 353, 357-60 (1891); see S. GARD, JONES ON
EVIDENCE 762 (6th ed. 1972).
36. S. GARD, supra note 35, at 762.
37. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87, at 204 (3d ed. 1984). The origins
of Roman law have been traced by the late eminent American scholar, Professor Charles Phin-
eas Sherman, D.C.L. (Yale). 2 C. SHERMAN, ROMAN LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 420 (2d.
ed. 1924). The cite referenced by Professor Sherman was to the Justinian Code 1, 20 Quando
libellus principi dutus litis contestationem tacit, and 4, 20 De Testibus.
38. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2291-2296, at 545-69 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
39. Id. § 2291, at 545. In People v. Gardner, 106 Cal. App. 3d 882 (1980), a written
statement by a prisoner addressed to "Public Defender" was held to fall within the privilege,
even though the court had not yet appointed a public defender. Id. See also Taylor v. Sheldon,
172 Ohio St. 118 (1961), 173 N.E.2d 892 (1961), and In re Petition of Sawyer, 129 F. Supp.
687, 696 (D. Wis. 1955), where communication was held to be inadmissable although attorney
refused to accept client and refused a fee.
1990]
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is that adequate representation is premised on full and frank disclosure,'
and that if attorneys were compelled to testify against their clients, cli-
ents would understandably be loath to discuss the legality of contem-
plated conduct with their attorneys.4 Without such protections, the
client would be inadequately represented.
In the corporate context, interference in the flow of information be-
tween management and counsel may deter legal compliance in cases
where management seeks to determine the proper course of conduct.
For example, in Deere the counsel's opinion was meant to alert Deere's
management to an apparent conflict between a contractual clause and
EC law. If management thought such communications were not pro-
tected by privilege, they would be reluctant to seek advice. Absent sound
advice, management might act or fail to act without adequate knowledge
of the law. The privilege is intended to ensure clients' confidence in the
secrecy of their communications42 and to promote greater freedom of
consultation so that appropriate decisions will be made.43
Implicit in the recognition of the privilege is a public policy decision
that the potential cost to the administration of justice in a particular case
is outweighed by the benefit of according litigants the privilege. How-
ever, the privilege is not extended blindly to protect communications
whose purpose is to further violations of civil or criminal law, or to inter-
fere with the proper enforcement of these laws. On the contrary, the
privilege does not extend to the disclosure of inequities or frauds.'
40. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
41. See id. (citing Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888)).
42. Harrison v. State, 345 A.2d 830, 839 (Md. 1975). In elaborating on this theme, the
court in Pratt v. State, 387 A.2d 779, 781 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978), held: "[Tihe theory
behind the creation of the privilege is that a lawyer can act effectively only when he is fully
advised of the facts and a client's knowledge that a lawyer cannot reveal his secrets promotes
full disclosure."
The opinion of Sir Gordon Slynn in AM&S suggests the Court of Justice's recognition of
similar policy grounds:
Whether it is described as the right of the client or the duty of the lawyer, this
principle has nothing to do with the protection or privilege of the lawyer. It springs
essentially from the basic need of a man in a civilized society to be able to turn to his
lawyer for advice and help, and if proceedings begin, for representation; it springs no
less from [the understanding that] persons... should be able to know what they can
do under the law, what is forbidden, [and] where they must tread circumspectly ....
AM&S Europe v. EEC Commission, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1575, 1654, [1979-1981
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8757, at 9037, 9084.
43. Spitzer v. Stillings, 142 N.E. 365, 366, 368 (Ohio 1924). For a discussion of the appli-
cation of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context, see Belcoure, Keeping the Com-
pany's Secrets-The Attorney-Client Privilege After Upjohn, [32 No. 7] FED. B. NEWS & J. 278
(Sept. 1985).
44. See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933).
[Vol. 13
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IV. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY AND NON-EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAWYERS
The communications sought to be protected in AM&S would likely
have fallen under the protection of attorney-client confidentiality under
laws of both the United States and the Member States. Likewise, the
communications of in-house counsel in Deere would likely have been
protected from disclosure under the United States law and laws of the
Member States that recognize the full professional status of counsel re-
gardless of the employment relationship. Nevertheless, the Court of Jus-
tice made clear in AM&S that the privilege of confidentiality is limited to
EC counsel, and in particular to independent counsel. It is implicit from
the decision in Deere that the Court did not hesitate to enforce the newly
defined standard in cases where the allegedly protected communications
do not satisfy the three criteria advanced in AM&S.45
The Court's decision in AM&S to establish uniform confidentiality
standards and exclude in-house counsel from its protection is not inher-
ently inconsistent with EC goals. EC Treaty article 48 unequivocally
provides for the freedom of individual citizens to render services any-
where in the EC.46 EC lawyers are entitled to practice their profession
unfettered in any one of the Member States, regardless of the state from
which they hail,47 and the uniform application of legal principle, as the
45. John Deere v. EEC Commission, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 35) 58, 61 (1985). This
fact is evidenced by references in the opinion to documents prepared by Deere's in-house coun-
sel. Id.
46. EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 48, at 98. Article 48 provides:
1. Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Community by
the end of the transitional period at the latest.
2. Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based
on nationality ... as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of
work and employment.
3. It shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy
(a) to accept offers of employment,...;
(b) to move freely within the territory of the Member States...
(c) to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment...,
Id. Article 52 provides:
[R]estrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the
territory of another Member State shall be abolished by progressive stages in the
course of the transitional period. Such progressive abolition shall also apply to re-
strictions on the setting up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any
Member State established in the territory of any Member State.
Id. at 99.
47. AM&S Europe v. EEC Commission, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1575, 1612, [1979-
1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) f 8757, at 9037, 9060
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application of uniform standards to the movement of goods, facilitates
this principle. Also, despite some arguments to the contrary,48 extension
of the protection of the privilege to in-house counsel might well have
violated the requirement that EC law be derived, whenever possible,
from a commonality of Member States' legal principles.4 9 Although in-
house lawyers in the United States have long been considered to possess
full professional status, not all EC Member States recognize the full pro-
fessional status of in-house counsel.5 ° The issue of the proper treatment
48. Id. at 1648-51, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder) Common Mkt. Rep. at 9081-83 (Opinion
of Sir Gordon Slynn).
49. It may also violate articles 85 and 86, which provide that the EC rules must be applied
uniformly among the Member States. EEC Treaty, supra note 4, arts. 85-86, at 107-08.
50. AM&S, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1655, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common
Mkt. Rep. at 9085. A number of United States decisions have addressed the subject of corpo-
rate counsel, when the lawyer is a full-time employee of the corporation. Questions have
arisen when the lawyer is himself a part of the corporate official structure, and when the
knowledge acquired is not in the capacity of counsel, but in the capacity of corporate official.
Most of the case law supports the claim of privilege if the attorney is acting in a professional,
rather than a business, capacity. The cases are divided, however, between whether the subject
matter of the communication or the status of the attorney as part of the control group of the
company is dispositive. See United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357
(1950); Wise v. Western Union Tel. Co., 36 Del. 456, 178 A. 640 (1935); Waldman, Beyond
Upjohn: The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Contest, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 473,
487 (1987); Note, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: Culpable Employees, Attorney Ethics
and the Joint Defense Doctrine, 58 TEx. L. REV. 809, 812 (1980).
Sir Gordon Slynn in AM&S, apparently relying on a report published by the Consultative
Committee of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Community (the CCBE) (D.A.O.
EDWARD, supra note 21) indicated:
The position of the lawyer who is employed as such by an undertaking has been
much canvassed. As I understand it, in some Member States full time employment is
incompatible with the full professional status of a lawyer (apparently in Belgium,
France, Italy, and Luxembourg): in others the employed lawyer remains subject to
professional discipline and ethics. Where the lawyer who is employed remains a
member of the profession.., in my opinion he is to be treated ... the same way as
lawyers in private practice, so long as he is acting as a lawyer.
AM&S, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1655, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep.
at 9085. Italian law, however, should respect a finding of confidentiality for corporate attor-
neys, since the law draws no distinction on its face. According to Codice Penale, article 622:
Chiunque, avendo notizia, per ragione del proprio stato o ufficio, o della propria
professione o arte, di un segreto, lo rivela, senza giusta causa, ovvero lo impiega a
proprio o altrui profitto, 6 punito, se dal fatto pub derivare nocumento, con ]a reclu-
sione fino o un anno o con la multa da lire sessantamila a un milioni ....
According to I1 Nuovo Codice di Procedura Penale, article 200:
Non possono essere obbligati a deporre su quanto hanno consosciuto per ragione
del proprio ministero, ufficio o professione, salvi i casi in cui hanno l'obbligo di rifer-
irne all'autoriti giudiziaria:
b) gli avvocati, i procuratori legali, i consultenti tecnici e i notai ....
In Radiant Burners v. America Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963), Hastings, C.J. stated:
"[I]t is our considered judgment that based on history, principle, precedent and public policy
the attorney-client privilege in its broad sense is available to corporations, and we so hold." Id.
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of communications between non-EC lawyers and their clients is a sepa-
rate question, however. That particular question was not before the
Court in AM&S, and neither party to the controversy suggested that any
distinction whatsoever be made between EC and non-EC lawyers. The
Court, nonetheless, intentionally drew the distinction."
There are a number of reasons why the Court's decision affecting
non-EC lawyers is problematic both within the context of EC and inter-
national law. First, as at least one commentator has already pointed out,
the Court's decision may not be based upon criteria common to Member
States' law because many Member States currently extend legal privilege
to communications from non-EC legal advisors.52 Second, apart from
important notions of international comity, the decision appears to be in
violation of article 234 of the EC Treaty by contradicting prior agree-
ments between Member and non-Member States. Article 234 forbids the
EC from interfering with rights and duties between Member and non-
Member States, such as those set forth in bilateral Treaties of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation with the United States. These Friendship
Treaties typically require each signatory nation to reciprocally guarantee
nationals and companies the right to engage lawyers of their choice.
Such a treaty has long existed between the United States53 and each of
the Member States with the exception of England. As previously men-
tioned, England, which is notoriously fond of confidentiality,5 4 grants the
at 323; see also Alpha Beta Co. v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. App. 3d 818, 203 Cal. Rptr. 752
(1984).
51. As Sir Gordon Slynn pointed out, the Court of Justice in AM&S was in possession of
the document report which indicated that independent lawyers had prepared many of the
documents. AM&S, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1643-45, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. at 9078.
52. Crinion, supra note 8, at 146 n.82.
53. See, eg., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 2, 1948, United
States-Italy, art. 5, para. 4, 63 Stat. 2255, 2262-64, T.I.A.S. No. 1965.
54. Blanket confidentiality, as extended to colonies, has hindered the law enforcement
operations of various states, including the United States. British secrecy laws, although not as
well publicized as those of Switzerland and other jurisdictions, can be.just as difficult to pene-
trate in either a civil or criminal proceeding. There are normally at least three hurdles to
obtaining evidence in legal proceedings from parties governed by British law. First is the
common law principle of banking secrecy, stemming from Tournier v. National Provincial &
Union Bank of England, [1924] 1 K.B. 461. Second is the letter rogatory process. English
law, as extended to her colonies, prohibits the furnishing of evidence unless the proceeding for
which the evidence is requested is sufficiently advanced. What stage in the proceeding is con-
sidered sufficiently advanced depends on whether the proceeding is civil or criminal. The
Court must either be contemplating the proceeding or have issued the indictment. Sutherland,
The Use of Letter of Request for the Purpose of Obtaining Evidence for Proceedings in England
and Abroad, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 784, 823-24 (1982). Third are certain statutory secrecy
and blocking laws which provide civil and sometimes criminal penalties for disclosure. Id.
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privilege to foreign counsel notwithstanding the Treaty. Third, if the
decision is in violation of article 234, it follows that such constraints on
the ability of an attorney to assure confidentiality of attorney-client com-
munications may directly violate the individual treaties. Finally, the fail-
ure to extend attorney-client privilege to communications between non-
Member attorneys and their clients represents a barrier on the use of
non-Member legal services. This disparity in treatment would not be tol-
erated among the Member States, and would be construed as a violation
of the letter and spirit of the EC."
Therefore, this author proposes that the Community initiate action
to ensure that the privileged communications between non-EC lawyers
and their clients are accorded the same protection of confidentiality ex-
tended to communications between EC lawyers and their clients. In the
absence of equitable treatment, the United States should pursue legisla-
tive alternatives that would ensure reciprocal treatment. Additionally,
further discussion over the issue of extending confidential communica-
tions to in-house counsel should take place within the deliberative bodies
of the EC.
V. CONCLUSION
The movement toward a more unified Europe through the elimina-
tion of trade barriers has been fueled by a fundamental economic precept:
that disparate treatment of industries and transactions under separate
legal systems lead to market inefficiency, impeding, rather than facilitat-
ing, the flow of goods and services. Conversely, the precept can be ex-
pressed as follows: that unified standards and nondistortive economic
policies between countries lead to greater competition, healthier trade,
and a net gain in productivity and standard of living. Because this un-
derstanding goes to the very heart of the Single European Act, violations
of article 85, which outlaws the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition between the Member States, are considered the deadliest of
55. AM&S Europe v. EEC Commission, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1575, 1612, [1979-
1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 8575, at 9037, 9060. Further the Court
states:
Having regard to the principles of the Treaty concerning freedom of establish-
ment and the freedom to provide services the protection thus afforded by Community
law ... to written communications between lawyer and client must apply without
distinction to any lawyer entitled to practise (sic) his profession in one of the Member
States, regardless of the Member State in which the client lives.
Id., [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. at 9060. Apart from the legal propriety
of the decision, the rendering of legal advice for a fee is a significant service sector affected by
the decision.
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sins. Adherence to this economic principle has guided the United States
and Canada in efforts to achieve a bilateral free trade agreement, and will
hopefully guide other nations as we collectively move toward a more effi-
cient global economy.
The architects of this dramatic movement in Europe undoubtedly
recognized the inevitability of instances when laws, regulations, or stan-
dards of Member States would be inconsistent with those of non-Member
States. The EC anticipates that when these inconsistencies interfere with
trade relations, they will be the subject of international negotiation in
official and unofficial forums. The additional clout gained through the
integration of laws, regulations, and standards will strengthen the EC's
bargaining position. The creation of more restrictive standards for for-
eign competition through the disparate application of EC law, however,
is no mere inconsistency, particularly when the disparate application of
the law is applied to non-Member States that do not draw similar distinc-
tions. The ruling of AM&S ensures that different rules will be applied to
a competing non-EC service sector.
Two centuries ago, Europeans considered the radical events taking
place in the United States as "the great American experiment." Ameri-
can eyes are now focused on the "great European experiment," in the
expectation that it will not fail to implement what it sought to
accomplish.
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